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It is often suggested that the development o f regionalism and 
regional identities throughout the international system is 
detrimental to trends toward globalization. This article argues 
that the growth o f regionalism is not at the expense o f global­
ization. Rather, it is a trend which can be exploited in the 
development and implementation o f policy toward regions 
that traditionally have been less developed, less organized, and 
less influential in the international system. First defining and 
then examining the existence o f regionalism, this article pro­
vides theoretical justification for the growth o f regionalism 
today, focusing specifically on three regions: Southern Africa, 
the southern cone o f  South America, and Southeast Asia. 
Examining the growth o f regionalism in those three areas for 
a period o f 35 years, the degree o f organization in.each region 
over time is measured. Interpretation o f the data presented 
here results in discussion o f the necessity o f  regional cohesion 
in increasing a region’s influence at the global level. The article 
concludes with speculation about the different ways in which 
the international system or a representative nation such as the 
United States might be expected to react to higher levels o f 
regional organization. Policy implications are discussed 
throughout.
The author is a Master of International Affairs candidate at the Elliott School of 
International Affairs, The George Washington University.
The Growth of Regionalism: Implications for the International System
I n t r o d u c t io n
Regionalism is a term often used but rarely defined in current discussion 
of international affairs. It is identified regularly as a vague threat to trends 
toward globalization and is generally assumed to have negative connota­
tions. Regions are the building blocks o f the international system and 
changes that take place within them affect the international system overall. 
For that reason, the discussion of regionalism is relevant to both inter­
national systems study and policymaking. Indeed, regions and their 
development provide a context for the explanation of systemic trends and 
governmental trends, some of which are speculated upon at the end of this 
article.
The argument in this study points to the fact that one of the clearest 
manifestations of regionalism is the development o f regional multilateral 
institutions, simultaneously making the argument that the development 
of regional institutions and the higher degree of organization which it 
implies about a region have implications for the way the region interacts 
with the international system overall. A practical manifestation of this 
might be seen in differences in a systemic institution’s or representative 
nation’s policymaking and implementation relating to a region, varying 
with the level of regional organization.
T  o provide theoretical j ustification for the development of cooperation 
in the form of multilateral institutions is the first task of this article. For 
purposes o f this argument, neoliberal institutionalism is used as a theoreti­
cal explanation not only for increased cooperation among states but also 
for the development of multilateral institutions. The existence of such 
institutions and their growth over time in a particular geographic area is 
pointed to as a manifestation of regionalism.
The applicability o f the aforementioned theoretical arguments to the 
development of regionalism is also discussed. Several perspectives on 
regionalism are examined, with emphasis on the development of region- 
ally-oriented institutions in three developing areas of the world: Southern 
Africa, the southern cone of South America, and Southeast Asia. The 
degree of organization in these regions over time is measured, and 
discussion centers on the relationship between the existence of a multi­
lateral institution and the level o f intra-regional organization. Using 
empirical evidence, this article shows how the three regions’ development, 
specifically the degree of organization among states in a region, has 
increased since the 1960s, suggesting that the characteristics of regional­
ism can develop both with and without the existence of a central 
multilateral institution.
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Finally, discussion turns to the systemic consequences of changing 
degrees of regional organization, whether or not it results from the 
establishment o f regional institutions. What higher levels of regional 
organization mean for the way the international system in general, and the 
system’s representative states in particular, relate to a region is considered. 
Certainly, changes in a region’s degree of organization are interesting on 
their own merit. However, this article attempts to put those changes in a 
systemic context, suggesting that implications for the international system 
result from higher levels of regional organization and addressing the 
question of how the degree of regional organization makes a difference in 
the way the system reacts to a specific region. It is reasonable to expect that 
policies toward a region will vary in relation to the region’s degree of 
organization. Discussion concludes with suggestions for further study of 
the systemic implications speculated upon here.
T h e o r e t ic a l  B a c k g r o u n d
Before delving into analysis of increasing intra-regional cooperation, it is 
first necessary to provide a general discussion ofwhy states cooperate at all. 
Reasons why cooperation is prevalent in regions are discussed at a later 
point. The general assumptions and theoretical reasoning behind inter­
national cooperation must first be put forth to justify discussion of 
cooperation at the regional level later. Furthermore, it is important to 
make clear this article’s assumption that states remain the most important 
actors in the international system.
Although the purpose o f this article is to consider the effects on the 
international system of the growth of multilateral regional institutions, the 
institutions considered here are those comprised of sovereign nation states 
that have willingly entered into cooperative arrangements with their 
neighboring states. Though they may contribute to a domestic mood 
supportive of interstate cooperation and ultimately the establishment of 
inter-state regional institutions, transnational and non-governmental 
organizations are not the focus o f this article. This article employs a 
system-level analysis in considering cooperation, changes in degrees of 
regional organization, and effects o f that degree of organization on the 
subsequent behavior of states. Such systemic emphasis in no way under­
mines the article’s intent to prove the significance of states bound together 
in official regionally-oriented institutions. The fact that states are increas­
ingly seeking the benefits derived from closer official cooperation with 
regional neighbors does not change the fact that states remain the primary 
actors in the international system.
Explaining Cooperation
Cooperation in the international system has long been discounted by 
realists who argue that, since the international system is fundamentally 
anarchic, cooperation among sovereign nations is not rational state 
behavior; if states do cooperate, it is for immediate gains at the expense of 
other states. Attacking the realists by incorporating integral parts o f their 
argument, the neoliberal institutionalists submit that cooperation is the 
result of potential for conflict. It is only when states, in seeking to protect 
their own interests, see that cooperation with other states will help them 
best realize their policy goals, that they opt for cooperation. International 
institutions, neoliberal institutionalists insist, provide a forum in which 
mutually beneficial arrangements can be made.
Anticipating the realist critique that, as a result o f the anarchy of the 
international system, there is no motivation or enforcement mechanism 
to force states to obey the rules set forth in institutions, the neoliberal 
institutionalists argue that a state’s failure to respect the norms of a given 
regime could damage the reputation of the offending state and make it 
more difficult for that state to enter into subsequent agreements, either 
bilateral or multilateral. Based on this assumption, states enter into 
agreements because to do otherwise would risk being excluded from 
international regimes, which could have negative repercussions. It is 
therefore in a state’s continued best interest to cooperate within the 
framework of an international institution despite the fact there is no 
hierarchical system ready to immediately punish those states that do not 
comply with its rules. This contributes to the neoliberals’ perception of 
international institutions as loose frameworks that have much to offer 
states that participate and abide by the rules.
Cooperation Manifested: A  Central Assumption 
Multilateral institutions are manifestations of cooperation. While the 
article focuses primarily on such institutions in a regional context, general 
discussion of the benefits states derive from participation in multilateral 
institutions is helpful for explaining why states participate. The generali­
ties o f this discussion can then be applied to the specifics of cooperation 
at the regional level. John Gerard Ruggie suggests the benefits of “diffuse 
reciprocity” as a motivating factor for cooperation in multilateral regimes. 
He defines multilateralism as “relations among three or more states on the 
basis o f generalized principles . . . which specify appropriate conduct. . . 
without regard to the . . .  interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies 
that may exist in a specified outcome” (Ruggie 1993, 12). Ruggie thus
provides an explanation for how and why states come together to cooper­
ate within the confines of an institution for the long-run, content to view 
the ongoing cooperative relationship as a non-zero sum game. In other 
words, one state’s gain at a particular period of time as a result of 
cooperation is not necessarily to the detriment of other cooperating 
states.
Arguments like Ruggie’s suggest that cooperation is not remarkable 
even given the relatively anarchic nature of the international system. 
Cooperative regimes can have an impact on states’ calculations of benefits 
and ultimately can alter the ways in which states define their interests. Not 
surprisingly, states choose to cooperate first with their neighbors, with 
whom they are likely to share some common cultural, societal, political, 
or economic characteristics— conditions that make cooperation easier to 
attain.
Cooperation in the international system has a number of implications 
for the way in which states relate to one another. That states recognize the 
inherent benefits o f diffuse reciprocity and thus agree to participate in a 
regional organization for the benefits it can provide is an assumption on 
which this article’s argument relies. Without this assumption, one must 
necessarily be distracted by offering explanations for why, despite no 
immediately obvious benefits o f a state’s membership in an organization, 
it remains a part of the group.
Free from the necessity of discussing specific motivations for coopera­
tion, this article will examine the implications o f changing degrees of 
organization in a region and its subsequent effects on the international 
system as a whole.
Regionalism Defined
The Link between Re^onalism and Globalization
In his discussion of regionalism, Andrew Hurrell presents a highly useful 
definition of globalization, calling it a “metaphor for the sense that a 
number of universal processes are at work generating increased intercon­
nection and interdependence between states and societies” (Hurrell 1995, 
345). This definition has utility because it identifies regionalism as part of 
the globalization process rather than being detrimental to it. For purposes 
of this article, regionalism is understood to be the development of those 
universal processes at a sub-systemic level.
The threat posed by regionalism is that those regional trends will lead 
to the fragmentation of the international system rather than to its 
unification. One scholar argues that the development of regions could lead
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in one of two different directions: segmentation or differentiation (Nierop,
1994). Segmentation is defined as the division of the overall international 
system into smaller parts, with international politics eventually becoming 
characterized by several different international systems or blocs instead of 
one world-wide system. In contrast, differentiation, it is suggested, is the 
development of a system of overlapping cobwebs where the relations 
among states in one issue area are not coincident with the same states in 
different issue areas. The reasoning contained within this article shows 
that one should not expect segmentation to be the result of growing levels 
of intra-regional organization. It is realistic, however, to expect to find 
more coordination than is implied by the definition of differentiation as 
a result of higher degrees o f organization within a specific region.
Thus, “regionalism” can be understood to be consistent with the 
definition put forth by Muthiah Alagappa: “Cooperation among govern­
ments or non-government organizations in three or more geographically 
proximate and interdependent countries for the pursuit of mutual gain in 
one or more issue-areas” (Alagappa 1995, 362). As mentioned earlier, 
discussion of cooperation here is limited to that between governments. 
Non-government cooperation is an equally valid aspect of regional 
development, though beyond the purview of this piece. Conclusions 
drawn throughout may be assumed to be at least partially applicable to 
discussion of non-state actors, particularly as they pertain to systemic 
implications of increasing degrees of organization in a region.
The development of regionalism can be presented in various ways and 
requires acknowledgment that increasing cooperation among states is a 
necessary condition for the appearance of regionalism; indeed, it is 
difficult to separate the cause from the effect. How regionalism manifests 
itself is the point of discussion in this section. Differing perspectives are 
offered in order to demonstrate various interpretations of the issue. As 
alluded to in the introduction, consideration of the different interpreta­
tions makes clear why the development of regions is seen as both a threat 
and a boon to globalization. Ultimately, this article concludes that 
regionalism can have more positive than negative effects on the process of 
globalization.
Characterizing Regionalism
According to Andrew Hurrell, what has come to be known as the new 
regionalism in international politics can be characterized by several 
different trends. Identification of these characteristics lends a great deal to 
the discussion of regionalism, particularly as it pertains to this article.
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First, there is great diversity in the number and type of regional 
schemes. The relationship between various regional organization types 
and their interactions with the global system, he suggests, is “central to the 
politics of contemporary regionalism” (Hurrell 1995, 332). Also impor­
tant for understanding the development of modern regionalism, Hurrell 
argues, are the development of “North/South regionalism,” the differ­
ences among regional organizations in the level o f institutionalization, the 
increasingly blurred line between political and economic regionalism, 
and, finally, the general increase in the number of regional organizations 
around the world (Hurrell 1995,332). Loosely defined, then, regionalism 
as it is understood today is a combination of these trends. Awareness of 
these trends is an important prerequisite to discussion of the development 
of regional organizations in the three regions on which this article focuses, 
as it shows how the development of such organizations in the three regions 
is not happening in a vacuum. Cases examined here are merely represen­
tative o f trends evident across the planet.
In addition to identifying its general characteristics, Hurrell also 
categorizes the concept of regionalism. His categories are addressed briefly 
here, with the intent of settling on a conceptualization of regionalism that 
is appropriate to the trends observed in the following case studies. He calls 
the first category “regionalization.” This term relates to the growth of 
“societal integration within a region and to the often undirected processes 
of social and economic interaction” (Hurrell 1995, 332). It encompasses 
growing flows of people as well as market rather than state-driven policy- 
linked integration.
It is also necessary to consider the concept of regional identity when 
discussing regionalism. There can be no doubt that growing awareness of 
regional identity contributes to what is increasingly recognized as region­
alism. Discussing regional identity, Hurrell writes, “As with nations, so 
regions can be seen as imagined communities which rest on mental maps 
whose lines highlight some features whilst ignoring others” (Hurrell 1995, 
335). Thus, although membership in a region for the purposes of this 
article is restricted to membership in the representative regional organiza­
tions, it is important to recognize that regions and regional identity are 
social constructs. It is only with the development o f cooperative policies 
and subsequent cooperative institutions that the social construct begins 
taking on concrete characteristics.
Additionally, Hurrell classifies regional inter-state cooperation as a 
category of regionalism (Hurrel 1995, 336). This concrete manifestation 
of regionalism involves the actual construction of intergovernmental
institutions, both formal and informal. It is a broad category, immediately 
relevant to the preceding theoretical discussion of motivation for partici­
pation in cooperative regimes. In a sense, regionalism is a manifestation of 
trends first identified and then justified by neoliberal institutionalists.
Lastly, Hurrell points to regional cohesion (Hurrel 1995, 337). This is 
the epitome of regionalism. It is the result of the full development of the 
characteristics of regionalism and it implies that a combination of 
regionalization, regional identity, and regional inter-state cooperation, as 
outlined above, could lead ultimately to the development o f a regional 
unit— a region-state. Much scholarly attention has been accorded to 
the region that has come closest to achieving this degree of regional 
cohesion— Europe, and its leading institution, the European Union. The 
intent of this project is to examine instead the development of three 
regions which traditionally receive less attention, particularly with respect 
to application of theoretical arguments in conjunction with practical 
discussion of policy applications.
Indeed, the majority of regionalist writings employ Europe as a case 
study of the development of regional identity and the move toward the 
attainment of a region-state. This study deliberately focuses on developing 
countries in regions o f the world which are generally of less interest to 
scholars seeking to prove regionalist arguments. In order to truly under­
stand the dynamics o f regionalism and changes in degrees of regional 
organization, it is necessary to consider regionalism in its early stages and 
to speculate upon how changes in regional organization in a developing 
region might influence the way the system or its representative states may 
respond to the region and its constituent parts.
Identifying Degrees o f “Regionness”
Hurrell’s identification of regionally-oriented trends leads to discussion of 
what can be called levels o f “regionness.” Distinctions between these levels 
are made by Bjorn Hettne (Hettne 1994, 134—66). Providing concrete 
examples of regionalism and distinctions between degrees, his presenta­
tion of the characteristics of degrees of regional organization suggests 
further that the evolution of a region is a continuing process, and that 
different regions o f the world are simply at different stages of development. 
That there can be different degrees o f organization is demonstrated in this 
article’s case studies as attention is given to three specific regions and to the 
development o f degrees of organization in these regions over time.
At the first level o f regional organization, Hettne identifies a region 
simply as a unit with specific geographic and ecological characteristics. He
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suggests, as an example, the Indian subcontinent, or Europe from the 
Urals to the Atlantic. The second level o f organization is that of a region 
as a social system, implying social, cultural, and political relations within 
the region. This would include a balance of power system in the region, 
very real in terms of its impact on states in the region, but not consciously 
constructed by those states. Third, he defines a region as an area of 
cooperation on political, military, economic, and cultural matters, de­
fined by regional organizations. Finally, Hettne considers regions as 
complete regional civil societies, promoting increasing social communica­
tion in the region as well as convergence of values, emphasizing culture. 
Common culture is a prerequisite for the final level of regional organiza­
tion: a regional state (Hettne 1994, 135—6).
These comments form a clear parallel to Hurrell’s discussion. Com­
bined consideration of both Hurrell’s and Hettne’s arguments presents a 
fairly complete picture of how regionalism is conceptualized, and it 
identifies the signs o f increasing degrees o f regional development. Discus­
sion of their perceptions serves as an introduction to what regionalism can 
look like, depending upon interpretation. The trends that Hurrell de­
scribes and the degrees of regional organization that Hettne identifies are 
presented here as background for the dynamics leading to what is actually 
observed in the case studies below.
Having introduced regionalism and its various conceptualizations, as 
well as its links to global (systemic) trends, discussion now turns to the 
three case studies which show how degrees of regional organization have 
increased in the last 35 years. The author agrees with arguments put forth 
by both Hurrell and Hettne which suggest that trends in regionalism 
ultimately can lead to the development o f a more unified regional actor. 
This article’s argument goes a step further by suggesting that the resulting 
changes in the nature of the region’s interaction with the international 
system have significant systemic implications. Before addressing those 
implications, however, discussion must first turn to the three case studies 
which show how degrees o f regional organization have increased in the last 
35 years. This sets the stage for specific discussion about how the degree 
of regional organization influences a region’s interactions with the inter­
national system.
T h ree  C a se  S t u d ie s : M e a su r in g  
THE D e g r e e  o f  R e g io n a l  O r g a n iz a t io n
Using the preceding discussion as context, the following case studies are 
intended to show the measurement of degree of regional organization.
Theoretical discussion has shown the motivations of states to seek coop­
eration in international tegimes. Discussion of regionalism has accepted 
those motivations and gone on to identify practical trends in cooperation 
at the regional level. This section is intended to present a way to measure 
the distinctions between levels o f “regionness” in three specific regions: 
Southern Africa, the southern cone of South America, and Southeast 
Asia.
It is expected that the establishment o f a regional institution increases 
the degree of organization and interaction among states in a region. This 
study expects to prove that levels of organization in a region increase after 
the establishment of a regional multilateral institution. This is consistent 
with Joseph Nye’s basic argument in Peace in Parts where he argues that 
“Regional organizations help create islands of peace in world politics” 
(Nye 1971, 198). The systemic implications of the resulting peace are 
discussed following the case studies.
An alternative perspective, which the case studies here show should be 
considered, is that the relationship can also work in the other direction: 
increasing levels of organization within a region can lead to the establish­
ment of a regional institution. Regardless o f the order in which increased 
levels of intra-regional organization and regional institutions develop, and 
there does seem to be evidence that it can go either way, the implications 
for the international system and policymaking remain the same.
Methodological Approach and Rationale
The purpose o f the case studies is to argue that, as the level of organization 
in a region increases, one should expect to see increased levels of contact 
and interconnectedness among states o f that region, and that these 
changes can be measured. It is predicted that three major aspects o f a 
region’s interstate relations (generalized interaction, economics, and 
security) change following the establishment of a regional institution and 
result in the following: increases in the number of regional institutions, 
increased intra-regional economic contact, and decreased spending on 
weapons imports. Together these changes are considered representative of 
an increased level of organization in a particular region.
Theoretically these increased levels will be manifested in greater num­
bers of regional organizations, increasingly higher percentages of trade 
conducted within a region, and decreases in amounts of money spent on 
import of weapons to a region. It is posited that the combination of these 
three measurable changes can be used to track increases in degrees of 
organization in a region over a thirty-five year period of time, and can be
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used to produce a scale showing change over time in the degree of intra­
régional organization. All three factors were chosen with the expectation 
that increased cooperation among states can be measured (See Table 1). 
For purposes of discussion of regionalism, this higher degree of regional 
cooperation is termed a change in “degree of organization” of a region.
The first factor considered for measure of degree of regional organiza­
tion is applicable for fairly obvious reasons. The number of regionally- 
oriented institutions to which countries in a region have belonged through 
the years is considered a valid indicator o f the level o f “regionness.” It 
allows one to tap into the government relations aspect o f changes in the 
degree of organization in a region. It is assumed that the higher the number 
of institutions in a region, the higher the degree of organization in that 
region. Increases in their number through time would indicate one trend 
in the direction of higher degrees of intra-regional organization. The 
assumption is that higher numbers o f regional institutions are then 
indicative o f higher levels of governmental interaction and cooperation. 
This is true for increases in all three factors under consideration in this case 
study, but is most clearly visible in this measure.
The export statistics o f countries in a region over time is the second 
indicator o f changes in degrees o f regional organization. In the case 
studies, trade figures for each country in a defined region are examined at 
a given period of time, with the value of exports to other countries in the 
region expressed as a percentage of the total value of a country’s exports.
The percentages for each country of a region are then averaged, resulting 
in a single number representative of the intra-regional exports of a region’s 
countries as a percentage of the region’s total export value.
Export figures are an acceptable indicator of degree of regional organi- 
Mtion because they allow one to see changes over the course of time in the 
value of contact— in this case economic— among countries of a region. A 
clear example of Ruggie’s diffuse reciprocity, interaction, which in this 
case is economic cooperation, has benefits that are more than short-term 
and are spread around, not benefiting any state at the expense of others. 
Export figures serve as a measure of the economic aspect of changes in the 
degree of organization in a region. It is assumed that the greater the value 
of intra-regional exports, the more important good relations with neigh­
boring states become, and the more likely economic contact is to spur on 
additional interaction, thus further raising the degree of organization in a 
region.
The final factor considered in the case studies is the value of imports of 
conventional weapons to a region over time. This is chosen as an indicator 
in order to tap the security-related aspects o f changes in degree of regional 
organization. In choosing this factor, it is assumed that as cooperation 
among states increases, levels o f trust between countries in a region 
increase. This is manifested in decreases in the value of arms the region 
imports as a percentage of the total of world arms imports. In other words, 
as the governments o f countries o f a region become more familiar with one 
another, perhaps through high-level talks among leaders, the degree of 
trust among those countries’ governments subsequently increases. 
Increases in trust as a result of contact on various fronts are then mani­
fested in the decreasing value of arms imported to the region; as nations 
increasingly trust their neighbors, they will be less concerned about 
defending themselves against those neighbors. This can be explained 
through regional institutions, which, as suggested by both Keohane and 
Ruggie, offer states an attractive way to increase contact with other 
states in a region, thus promoting that contact and subsequent coopera­
tion.'
These three factors, considered at five year intervals for the period from 
1960 to 1994, are combined to arrive at a composite figure representing 
“degree of organization” for a given region at a particular period of time. 
Results are graphed for each region individually, with degree of organiza­
tion termed low, medium, or high at different time periods. It is expected 
that the most dramatic increases in degree of organization will be seen 
following the establishment o f the regional institution under consider-
ation. There must be some trend, however small, of increased regional 
interaction to justify the establishment o f formalized interactions, repre­
sented by the three institutions considered below. The relationship, of 
necessity, goes both ways, but the major developments are expected post- 
institutional establishment.
Even if this is not proven empirically, there is still expected to be 
sufficient evidence to argue that there has been an identifiable trend 
toward increasing degrees of regional organization in the last 35 years, 
whether or not it coincides with the establishment of a regional institution. 
The timing of increases in regional organization would be easiest to 
explain if they coincided with the founding of an institution. However the 
most important aspect of regionalism, for purposes of this article, are the 
changing degrees of organization, and linking those changes to specula­
tion about how the international system reacts to the changes.
Defining Regional Membership
As suggested by both Hurrell and Hettne’s discussions o f regionalism, one 
of the first challenges of considering regionalism is defining a region and, 
subsequently, identifying member nations. The three regions under 
discussion here are Southern Africa, the southern cone of South America, 
and Southeast Asia. Regional identity is defined simply as membership in 
the regional institution under discussion.
In the case of Southern Africa, the institution is the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC), including Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. For the case of South America, the 
institution under consideration is the Southern Cone Common Market 
(MERCOSUR). Member states o f that organization areArgentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. For Southeast Asia, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the organization on which discus­
sion will focus. Members include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phil­
ippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Southern Africa and the SADC
Originally founded in 1979 as the Southern Africa Development Com­
munity Conference (SADCC), the organization now known as the 
Southern Africa Development Community was intended to develop 
countries o f the region in order to lessen their dependence on South Africa. 
With the reorganization of the original multilateral institution in 1992, 
South Africa became a member, thus fully meeting the regime’s regional
membership potential. Although intended to be primarily economic 
in nature, the institution did clearly have political motivations in its 
origins, as shown by its early intent to reduce regional dependence on 
South Africa.
Writing about the older SADCC, Carol Thompson suggests the link 
between state and regional interests, as implied by the Neoliberal Institu­
tionalist argument presented earlier: “SADCC’s pursuit of balance and 
equity signifies a recognition that the most effective cooperation occurs 
when national and regional interests coincide” (Thompson 1992, 194). 
This statement verifies the relationship between state interest and regional 
cooperation, the same relationship that makes the neoliberal institution­
alist argument distinct from the realists.
Southern Africa is an interesting case precisely because it is one of the 
least developed regions economically. In this case, economic cooperation 
must be a prerequisite to any further cooperation. The first reason for this 
is that development cannot be undertaken alone by these countries which 
lack sufficient levels of natural resources to attain self-sufficiency. Second, 
economic development helps ensure that there is in fact more to link in the 
region in the future; economic development creates a framework within 
which further cooperation, both economic and otherwise, can take 
place.
As is evident in Table 2, the degree of organization in the region has 
increased fairly steadily since the establishment of the SADCC in 1979. 
This appears consistent with the argument that a regional institution 
promotes regional interaction and cooperation. Although prior to 1979 
there was some indication of regional development, it seems to have 
faltered, only to be reinstated by the establishment o f a regional institu­
tion. From the results o f the case study it is difficult to say definitively if 
the existence of SADCC and later of SADC further promoted trends 
toward regionalism in Southern Africa. This is partly because the estab­
lishment o f such organizations cannot be distinguished easily from the 
rising tide of regionalization.
What both Hurrell and Hettne identify as regionalism can be said to 
have developed in Southern Africa since I960. Increases in the degree of 
regional organization, which is in this study considered to be significant 
evidence of the growth of regionalism, have clearly taken place in Southern 
Africa since the early 1960s. Although Southern Africa remains one of the 
globe’s most impoverished regions, trends in regional development are 
nonetheless apparent. Practical evidence of this is seen in the discussion of 
regional problems, where the search for answers centers on the desire for
Table 2: Ranking of Factors Contributing to Degree of 
Regional Organization
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are seen in Appendix 1.
an “African solution” to African problems (Future Vision 2010: Africa, 
1996). This seems to be a growing indication of what Hurrell refers to as 
regional identity. The statistics examined in this article provide empirical 
evidence of the trend toward regionalization in Southern Africa.
The Southern Cone o f  South America and MERCOSUR
MERCOSUR is the newest of the regional institutions discussed in this 
project. It was established in early 1994, but this fact does not disqualify 
the region, that is M ERCOSUR’s current members, from consideration 
in this study. The purpose of its selection is to examine the development 
of a region with great potential for effective multipurpose institutions, 
unrealized until recently, and to determine if development of the degree 
of intra-regional organization is negatively impacted over time by the lack 
of such an institution. In reality, it seems quite the opposite is the case. 
According to analysis here, there has been steady growth in the degree of 
regional organization in this section of South America for at least the last 
35 years.
By including in the empirical analysis all five countries which are now 
members of MERCOSUR, the study clearly shows growing interaction 
among those states and potential for formalized cooperative institutions 
over time. To consider the five states in the study before the formal 
establishment of the institution is a risky venture, but the results seem to 
have warranted the risk. For example, although the five Latin American 
states currently participating in M ERCOSUR now have institutionalized 
relations on an increasing number of fronts, albeit still primarily economi­
cally-oriented, the increasing degree of organization among those states 
since 1960 provides evidence that, in at least some cases, increasing degrees 
of regional organization prompt the establishment o f formal institutions. 
In the Southeast Asian region, in contrast, the results are almost the 
opposite, with the establishment of a formal institution seeming to be the 
cause of higher degrees of regional organization. As noted earlier, regard­
less o f the cause o f higher levels of “regionness,” the implications for the 
international system remain the same. That is addressed in the next 
section.
As alluded to above, the primary purpose of MERCOSUR is, in fact, 
economic cooperation. The size of the M ERCOSUR market is a bit more 
than half that o f the European Union, and is composed of almost 200 
million consumers. As an indicator o f the degree to which economic 
cooperation has been achieved in the short period of time since the 
institution’s establishment, one business writer states that a foreign
company “can gain access to all [five] countries by investing in just one of 
them” (McCrary 1994, 86). The logical explanation for this can be found 
in the empirical evidence. Because there was already a high degree of intra- 
regional organization at the time M ERCOSUR was founded, the process 
of implementing the agreement was merely a formality. The practical 
groundwork for the agreement was already firmly in place, and clearly had 
been developing since at least the early 1960s. Furthermore, there is a 
growing tide o f commentary in which hopes for and belief in the 
institution’s ability to promote a broader range of cooperation encompass­
ing political and social issues are expressed. The results of this study 
indicate that there is potential for further cooperation since interaction 
among the states is already extensive and there is a good deal of familiarity 
among members.
The results o f examination of the South American region are the most 
striking of the three case studies here and presented the author with an 
analytical problem: the degree of intra-regional organization evidenced by 
this study’s focus on the countries that now comprise M ERCOSUR forces 
consideration of the possibility that the relationship between regional 
institutions and the degree of intra-regional organization is a two-way 
street. Not unlike the question, “Which came first, the chicken or 
the egg?”, the study’s results beg the question, “"Which came first, intra- 
regional organization or multilateral regional institutions?” As in other 
aspects of social science, it seems the answer is “it depends.”
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Southeast Asia and ASEAN
As the oldest o f the regional frameworks under consideration here, 
ASEAN and the region in which it operates were expected to provide the 
strongest evidence of the positive impact o f a regional institution on the 
development of the degree of organization in a region. As seen in Tables 
1 and 2, however, this did not prove to be the case. The establishment in 
1967 of a formal mechanism to promote intra-regional cooperation has 
not had the striking eflfects that its proponents may have anticipated. As 
with the African case, all countries which are presently members o f the 
organization were considered through all the time periods. In the case of 
Southeast Asia this has a marked effect due to the presence of Vietnam. 
The arms import factor negatively impacts the region’s degree of organi­
zation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nevertheless, the final graph is 
an accurate representation of the nature o f relations among states in the 
region.
As seen in Table 2, although the number of regional institutions has 
remained relatively low, the amount o f intra-regional trade has remained
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moderate and steady. The very steadiness o f those numbers is an indication 
of the effect of ASEAN. Although it too was founded with primarily 
economic intention in mind, ASEAN’s potential to serve as a mechanism 
for higher levels of political cooperation is well-recognized. It is the 
member states’ hesitation to pursue other aspects o f cooperation that 
prevents the institution from developing a better track record on multilat­
eral cooperation.
Regardless of the unexpectedly poor results for the ASEAN region in 
this study, it can still be argued that the long-standing institution has had 
a positive influence on the nature o f relations among states in the 
Southeast Asian region. Increased contact has led to less conflict and to 
greater exposure of various cultures in the region. As a recent article about 
ASEAN and its still unrealized potential acknowledges, “Before 1967 it 
was possible to think of Southeast Asia as a region in name only. The 
countries o f the region enjoyed geographic proximity but little else. In 
1960 for example, for every Thai who visited [neighboring countries], 
there were 200 who went to England, Erance, or the United States . . .  [I]t 
can be argued that ASEAN is largely responsible for creating the increased 
sense of regional identity” (Cronin and Metzgar 1996, 1). Even critics of 
ASEAN’s ability to perform on non-economic matters acknowledge the 
success of the institution in promoting intra-regional contact.
Although the SADC’s original motivation for cooperation as men­
tioned above was as a counterweight to South Africa’s initial regional 
influence, ASEAN’s external motivation for cooperation is increasingly 
relevant. One of the benefits ASEAN has provided since 1967 is decreased 
conflict among its members. The resulting unity is o f particular benefit as 
the region tries to find ways to respond to China. A number of ASEAN’s 
members are in disagreement, not only with each other but also with 
China over possession of the Sprady Islands. ASEAN’s ability to defuse a 
potentially dangerous situation in which China was poised to militarily 
assert its ownership of the islands shows how even states which had 
national interests involved chose to cooperate with regional neighbors in 
order to respond to a foreign threat. This would not have been possible 
without the contact promoted by ASEAN since the late 1960s.
As an older regional institution, at least as it relates to this study, 
ASEAN meets with more criticism than younger institutions like the 
SADC and MERCOSUR. ASEAN is increasingly criticized for not 
realizing its fitll political and security potential in the region (Cronin and 
Metzgar 1996,4). The economic success o f ASEAN is well-recognized and 
no one disputes the role it has played in the phenomenal economic growth 
seen in Southeast Asia over the last several decades, yet simply because of
its potential beyond the scope of economics, ASEAN is expected to do 
more.
The empirical results of this study of Southeast Asia indicate that 
increases in the degree of regional organization are not a given tvith the 
establishment of a regional institution. In fact, the ASEAN region is at 
present the only region of the three which is not at a high degree of regional 
organization. This is one of the most interesting results and one which 
certainly deserves further study.
Preliminary Conclusions
Analysis of the three factors this study considers relevant to the develop­
ment of degree of organization in a region has yielded interesting results, 
each with unique implications for the discussion of regionalism and wide- 
ranging implications for the international system as a whole. As suggested 
above, the existence of a regional institution is not a necessary precondi­
tion for the development o f intra-regional organization. In the case of 
Southern Africa, the SADC’s precursor institution’s establishment in 
1979 seems to have stabilized a drop in regional organization and set the 
region on an upward trend. This is consistent with the arguments of 
Hurrell and Hettne who argue that the establishment of an institution 
formalizes relations and sets the stage for more extensive cooperation. The 
only unexpected aspect o f the Southern Africa case study is that according 
to this study’s criteria. Southern Africa, as represented by the SADC, is 
currendy at a high degree of intra-regional organization. This is in contrast 
to conventional wisdom about the region which assumes Southern Africa 
is underdeveloped and continues to be handicapped by regional conflict.
In the Southern America region, as defined by membership in 
MERCOSUR, it seems the development o f an intra-regional organization 
among the five states progressed without the assistance of a formal 
multilateral institution. Although membership in other regional institu­
tions is a factor contributing to the degree of regional organization, 
because no other multilateral institution consists of that same combina­
tion of states, a higher occurrence of membership in regional institutions 
is a factor which, while contributing to the degree ofregional organization, 
does not overstate states’ cooperation. The five states have the steadiest 
development of regional organization of any regional institution in the 
study, but without the presence of a formal institution. While the 
arguments of both Hurrell and Hettne are very tempting theoretically, 
particularly with respect to expectations of further regional development 
after the establishment o f an institution, their arguments seem to have
been disproved in the case o f MERCOSUR. The Southern America 
example makes clear that institutionalized cooperation is not a necessary 
condition for the development of “regionness” or higher degrees of 
regional organization.
As mentioned above, the Southeast Asian case study produced the most 
unexpected results. It completes nicely the sample o f regional institutions 
considered here because the institution, ASEAN, was founded near the 
beginning of the time period under consideration. It is the only of the three 
cases where the name of the region is synonymous with the name of the 
institution. Yet it is the region with the most unrealized potential— in this 
case represented by the lowest current degree of regional organization. To 
reiterate, the important result becomes clear when compared with 
MERCOSUR, a group of states representing steadily growing degrees of 
regional organization without formalized relations; ASEAN and its states 
on the other hand, represent a region o f highly formalized relations with 
unsteady results.
While Nye’s comment about regional institutions forming “islands of 
peace in world politics,” is not untrue, it appears regional institutions are 
not the only way to achieve those islands o f peace. What is important for 
the international system is how those islands fit into the system as a whole. 
How the international system should be expected to respond to the 
varying relationships between regional institutions and degrees o f regional 
organization, and how lessons learned can be incorporated consciously 
into the dynamics o f the international system is the focus of the next 
section.
P r a c t ic a l  I m p lic a t io n s  o f  
I n c r e a se d  R e g io n a l  O r g a n iz a t io n
Analysis above has demonstrated the development o f higher degrees of 
regional organization over time in the three cases examined. The growth 
of regionalism, both with and without the aid of official regional multilat­
eral institutions has been proven, and it is expected that similar evidence 
would be found in similar analysis of other world regions. The next and 
final step is to consider how the international system responds to region­
alism. As mentioned previously, there is a link between regionalism and 
globalization; because the development o f regionalism does not happen in 
a vacuum, it is necessary to show how regionalism relates to systemic 
matters. As Hettne argues in his presentation of levels o f regionness, the 
development of regionalism is a process unfolding at three different levels. 
It affects the structure of the world system as whole, it affects the nature
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of relations within a region, and finally, it affects the internal patterns of 
nations in a particular region (Hettne 1994, 160). Having demonstrated 
the gradual development of intrarégional organization in the three case 
studies in the last section, the argument is now directed toward the effects 
of these developments on the international system. Attention is devoted 
specifically to the changes, which higher degrees of regional organization 
should be expected to cause, in the way the system or a representative 
nation approaches relations with a more highly organized region. The 
following discussion is intended to emphasize the implications of higher 
degrees of regional organization for the international system as whole.
The development o f higher degrees o f organization in a region is not an 
isolated affair. It is logical to expect to see differences in the way a region 
behaves as result of higher levels of regional organization, such as decreased 
conflict among states in a region. More importantly for the purposes of 
this discussion, however, one should also expect to see differences in the 
way the international system as a whole responds to a region. Regionalism, 
whether defined simply as higher degrees of regional organization or 
instead as its manifestation— regional institutions— should be expected to 
have an external, systemic impact. The development o f “regionness” at 
every level has an influence on the way the international system responds. 
This section is intended to discuss individual changes that one might 
expect to take place as the growth of regionalism continues. This is purely 
speculative. But discussion does suggest various ways in which the 
systemic response could be measured to determine the accuracy of 
suppositions put forth here.
Identifying a Systemic Actor
How one perceives the international system is the first step in speculation 
about how the development of regionalism should be expected to affect 
systemic behavior. To proceed with this hypothetical argument, an actor 
representative o f the international system and its priorities must be 
identified and its use in further discussion justified. The United Nations, 
the one truly universal actor in the international system, could be 
considered representative of the priorities o f the members of the inter­
national system, with its allocation of resources indicative o f systemic 
priorities. However, recent criticism of the U N ’s inability to perform its 
functions has been blamed on the American failure to meet its obligations 
to that international organization.
The American decision to withhold funding from the UN and the 
rationale behind it is a matter beyond the scope of this discussion. O f 
interest for the purposes of this article, however, is the apparent fact that
without American funding, the United Nations is unable to function 
fully. The successful U.S. effort to replace the Secretary General also 
implies the continuing strength of the United States in the international 
system and provides the rationale for this article’s consideration of the U.S. 
and its policies as representative of systemic priorities. Fair or not, as the 
most influential state in the international system, the United States can 
often be considered representative of the international system. Moral 
discussion of whether one state should exert such extreme international 
influence is a subject beyond the purview of this article. By identifying 
these two actors here the author seeks to suggest only that use of either U.S. 
or UN information relevant to the following categories in subsequent 
studies might allow one to begin to ascertain changes in the way the 
international system responds to regions at varying degrees of intra­
regional organization. It is expected that changes in state or other actor 
behavior can be assumed to have its origins in changed policies, thus 
making the link between changing degrees of regional organization and 
alterations in systemic priorities.
Perceptions of Regional Effectiveness and the Allocation 
of Resources
Much discussion of regionalism, at least by those who do not view it as a 
trend threatening to the process o f globalization, results in utopian 
predictions o f the development o f region-states. It is more practical to 
focus instead on the advantages which organized regions can reap at 
present, even without the elimination of national borders implied by the 
term region-state. The effectiveness of particular regional institutions is a 
factor worthy of systemic attention as systemic actors decide whether or 
not to devote resources to a particular organization or instead to its 
member states. How an institution has promoted regional organization, 
a subject considered above, could be used as an indicator o f that institution’s 
effectiveness. This matter is briefly discussed below.
Assuming that the international system recognizes changes in a region’s 
degree of internal organization, it is rational to expect changes in the way 
the system treats that region. It is speculated that there are several specific 
areas in which the attention devoted to a region could be expected to 
change. How increases in degree of regional organization affect the way the 
international system or a representative nation relates to a region is 
addressed.
Although any of the factors considered below would alone provide great 
insight into the way the international system responds to regional changes, 
the most complete discussion of the systemic implications of higher
degrees of regional organization would include consideration of at least 
what is listed below. Indeed, measurement of the following factors as they 
relate to a specific region over time would make quite clear the systemic 
implications o f changing degrees of regional organization as presented 
above. The following five factors are provided as suggestions for how best 
to tap into the specifics of what increasing degrees of organization in a 
region really mean for the international system, and how those changes 
might be expected to manifest themselves at the systemic level.
Economic Relations
The first of several areas in which one might expect to see concrete changes 
in systemic behavior as a result o f higher degrees o f regional organization 
includes changes in the type and distribution of foreign assistance and 
other economic contact. Here one must not fail to recognize that the 
amount o f aid received is not determined solely by degree of regional 
organization, but rather by an examination of the level of economic 
development. The SADC case is proof of that distinction. As degree of 
regional organization increases, the manner in which aid is distributed 
may be expected to change. So, too, the economic emphasis from abroad 
is likely to change. As the regional atmosphere becomes more conducive 
to international trade, one may expect to see increasing extra-regional 
trade.
In the case o f Southeast Asia, for example, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) is already donating large percent­
ages of its aid to the region to ASEAN projects rather than to the projects 
o f individual countries (United States Agency for International Develop­
ment, 1994). This indicates an awareness o f the potential of a region, 
organized under a stable, long-standing multilateral institution, to allocate 
resources in a way that is more beneficial to regional economic develop­
ment than it is to the welfare o f individual states. This could even be 
identified as an unexpected manifestation of diffuse reciprocity.
With respect to decreases in the actual amount o f development assis­
tance as a result o f regional organization, decreases related to regional 
organization could be expected if the system recognizes a region’s desire to 
find its own solutions to its own problems, as mentioned earlier concern­
ing the case o f Southern Africa. At present, however, it is clear that this 
African region remains too economically underdeveloped to be able to 
afford pursuit o f its own solutions at this time. Generally speaking, 
however, the ability o f a highly organized region to effectively allocate the 
development assistance it receives should not be underestimated. It seems
the U.S., an actor representative of the international system, has already 
recognized this.
On the practical side, the allocation of aid to competent regional 
institutions rather than to individual nation states tvould likely have 
budgetary benefits for programs like those of USAID because it would 
require less oversight. At the same time it would promote the growth of 
regional organization with the potential to further strengthen the leading 
regional institution.
The foreign assistance factor could be measured over time, determining 
the amount and type of aid allocated to a region, examining at the same 
time whether the majority of aid was given to individual states or to the 
representative regional institution. Collection of this information (for 
example, from aid figures o f the United States) combined with a measure­
ment of degree of regional organization as ascertained earlier, would allow 
a comparison of aid relative to degree of organization. Results would 
provide insight into the international system’s ability to recognize changes 
in degree of regional organization and to respond accordingly. This would 
be one means of measuring changes in the international system’s attention 
to a region.
Foreign Relations
It is likely that as the degree of organization in a region changes, the issues 
with which diplomatic representation in those countries deal will also 
change. Consider the role o f American diplomatic staff, for example. As 
economic development and other forms of cooperation proceed peace­
fully, partially as the result o f improved relations among regional states, the 
duties o f diplomatic staff change. Instead of promoting regional aid 
programs or attempting to defuse regional conflicts which can detract 
resources from programs more oriented toward the further development 
o f regional cooperation, staff might instead be promoting educational or 
cultural exchange programs or the development o f tourism to further 
promote regional ties.
Also related to increased regional interaction, the international system 
might promote further security cooperation in the form of military 
exchanges and joint training. This would be to the benefit of the 
international system because it would contribute to uniformity of both 
procedure and perhaps equipment throughout the region. Increased 
contact and familiarity further eliminates the possibility of conflict and 
breeds trust— both ofwhich are priorities o f an international system which 
seeks to use regionalism as a stepping stone to globalization.
Additionally, as a region increases its level of organization, it is likely 
one will find that the benefits derived from the increases contribute to 
higher level attention from system actors. One might expect to see an 
increase in state visits to a region as the level of regional organization 
increases. High profile visits could coincide with high-level meetings of 
the primary regional institution, giving further legitimacy to the insti­
tution and showing systemic support for the continued growth of 
the institution and the degree of regional organization to which it 
contributes.
This switch in systemic behavior and priorities would be based on the 
assumption that the system values the further development of regions for 
the benefits it produces, instead of fearing the worst-case scenario sug­
gested by Nierop’s definition of segmentation.
Like the foreign assistance factor, the diplomatic attention factor could 
also be measured over time, using U.S. or UN figures as representative of 
the international system. Measurements could be attained by examining 
the division of labor at American Embassies or UN offices in all the 
countries of a region over time. One would seek information in particular 
about programs encouraged by staffs as discussed above, such as ex­
changes, security cooperation, or preparation for state visits. When 
compared with the degree of regional organization over the same time 
period, results would indicate how systemic priorities change and at what 
degree of organization the most significant changes occur. This, too, 
would indicate changes in the attention a region receives from the 
international system relative to degree of regional organization.
Media Coverage
A third area in which one might expect to see changes in the way the 
international system reacts to different degrees o f organization in a region 
is in the international news coverage allocated to the discussion of regional 
issues. As the degree of regional organization increases, the type of 
coverage devoted to a region is expected to change.
Fora region with a low degree of organization, characterized as implied 
earlier by regional conflict or epidemics, international news coverage 
could be expected to be sporadic but intense. An example would be the 
coverage of Rwanda in American media. As a result o f conflict between 
two ethnic groups, hundreds o f thousands of refugees have crossed 
national borders seeking shelter. In a region with a higher degree of 
organization, one might expect refugee flows to be prevented or at least 
controlled, thus removing the need for intense international coverage.
As the degree of intra-regional organization increases, the same factors 
which could contribute to changes in the type of aid received by a region 
could influence the type of coverage a region receives. Ina more stable and 
more highly organized region, international media attention would likely 
be more steady and more focused on fewer crisis-related matters. Instead 
of political conflict or humanitarian crises, the focus o f attention could 
become investment opportunities, promotion of tourist destinations, and 
cultural and educational exchanges. In other words, it is assumed the 
stability o f a region increases with the increase in the level of regional 
organization, and with regional stability comes a different kind o f inter­
national media attention.
The media variable could be measured by categorizing coverage of a 
region over time, noting changes in degree of regional organization over 
the same period, and identifying patterns. International media attention 
could be measured by surveying over a period of time American news or 
a combination of countries’ coverage of a region, focusing primarily on 
newspaper and television, identifying stories by type. Possible categories 
include humanitarian and epidemic crises, political upheaval (both civil 
and regional), sports, culture, finance, tourism, and political develop­
ment.
Results o f a comparison of international news coverage of a region over 
time with the degree of intra-regional organization would provide insight 
into how the international system responds to changes in regional devel­
opment. The media factor is a particularly important one because of its 
ability to influence international public opinion. The effects of improved 
international opinion of a region would likely have an effect on the other 
factors discussed in this section. Favorable public opinion of a particular 
region in an aid-giving country might, for example, allow for increased aid 
allocations to the region. At the same time it could force high level official 
attention, thus changing the nature of diplomatic relations between the 
system or its representative nations and the region.
M ultinational Corporations (MNCs)
Finally, it is speculated that MNCs, thriving on stability and potential or 
realized economic growth, which, as suggested above, are two related 
manifestations of higher degrees o f regional organization, would be more 
likely to establish operations in regions with higher degrees of organiza­
tion. Discussion of M NCs presents the problem of analyzing actors that 
are not directly affiliated with states and yet are increasingly important 
parts of the international system.
In this situation particularly, it would be difficult to distinguish 
between motivating factors for the establishment of a M N C’s operations; 
discussion here has indicated that the line between a region’s attractiveness 
because o f its degree of regional organization versus its attractiveness as a 
developing economic area is a fine one indeed.
Measurements o f M NCs’ presence throughout a region could be taken 
by determining what percentage of the region’s economic activity results 
from the business of MNCs. A comparison of that figure over time with 
the degree o f regional organization would allow some insight into how, if 
at all, the presence of MNCs in a region is influenced by degree of regional 
organization. As suggested by Peter Cowhey and Jonathon Aronson, 
private firms are more likely to respond to international changes than 
governments (Cowhey and Aronson 1993, 236). This might allow one to 
expect reasonably that changes in the regional presence of MNCs would 
be detected sooner than changes in various government behavior, such as 
foreign assistance and diplomatic attention. In fact, one could even find 
that changes in M NCs’ policies are precursors of other systemic changes. 
This reason alone provides sufficient justification for consideration of the 
presence and activity of MNCs in a region.
C o n c l u sio n
Clearly there are numerous ways in which changes in the attention of the 
international system and its representatives can be related to the degree of 
organization in a region, with a variety of implications for policymaking. 
The last section suggested a few possibilities for further study, comment­
ing on the usefulness and applicability o f each, and noting pitfalls where 
evident.
From the outset, this article has attempted to place the development of 
regionalism in a systemic context. The immediately preceding section is 
merely the most clearly articulated link between the development of 
regions and the international system and the changes one might expect to 
see manifested in policymaking concerning regions and the international 
system overall. Such discussion, however, remains purely speculative.
Discussion has demonstrated the rationality of expecting regional 
trends to influence the behavior of the international system. This study has 
been intended to provoke further discussion of regionalism with an eye 
toward systemic implications, suggesting examination of changes in 
systemic attention over time as they compare to the degree of regional 
organization. It is hoped that empirical examinations of changes in 
systemic attention resulting from varying degrees o f regional organization.
r
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the groundwork for which is laid out above, will be pursued by interested 
parties in the future.
APPENDIX 1
Raw Data for each region
Sources: Regional Institution information taken from CIA World Factbook, various issues 
from 1980 to 1995; Yearbook of International Organizations 1994/1995- Intra-regional 
export information taken from International Trade Statistics Yearbook 1961, 1967, 1977, 
and 1987; IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 1989 and 1995. Weapons import information 
taken from SIPRI Yearbook 1976, 1981, 1986, and 1994.
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APPENDIX 2
Explanation o f  Raw D ata Ranking System 
1. Manipulating Raw Data
The data in Appendix 1 are examined for each of the three categories: 
number of regional institutions, percent of intra-regional exports, and 
weapons imports as percent o f world total. The raw numbers are broken 
down into three levels: low, medium, and high. The purpose of Part 1 of 
Appendix 2 is to present the break-down of raw data as an explanation for 
the low, medium, and high rankings found in Table 1 in the text.
A. Number of regional institutions
The number of regional institutions is the first factor contributing to this 
study of degree of regional organization over time. The numbers in this 
row throughout Appendix 1 are the sum of the number of inter-govern­
mental regional institutions in existence during the time period under 
discussion. The ranking system is as follows:
0—3 institutions: LOW 
4—6 institutions: MEDIUM 
More than 7 institutions: HIGH
B. Percent of intra-regional exports
The percentage of intra-regional exports is the second factor contributing 
to this study of degree of regional organization over time. The numbers in 
this row throughout Appendix 1 are percentages of exports within the 
region as a percentage of country totals by the countries belonging to the 
region during each time period under discussion. The percentages are 
averages of each member country’s intra-regional export figures. The 
ranking system is as follows:
6—10 percent: LOW
> 10—20 percent: MEDIUM
> 20 percent: HIGH
C. Value of regional weapons imports as percentage of world total 
The percentage of regional weapons imports as a percentage of the world 
total is the third factor contributing to this study of degrees of regional 
organization over time. The numbers in this row throughout Appendix 1 
are percentages o f the value of a region’s weapons imports during each time 
period under discussion. The percentages are taken from a calculation of
regional weapons import value relative to world totals. The ranking system 
is as follows:
>10  percent: LOW 
> 6 —10 percent: MEDIUM 
0—6 percent: HIGH
2. Ranking Degree of Regional Organization
The purpose of Part 2 of Appendix 2 is to explain how the information 
contained in Table 2 in the text was prepared.
As mentioned in Table 1, every LOW score is given a value of 1; every 
MEDIUM score is given a value of two; and every HIGH score is given 
a value of 3. In determining the final ranking of degree of regional 
organization, the numerical values associated with every L, M, and H are 
added together. This results in a score for each region at each time period 
under consideration. This numerical score is the “degree of regional 
organization.” The scores are compared over time, showing the develop­
ment or lack thereof of regional organization. The ranking system is as 
follows:
0—4: LOW degree of regional organization 
5—6: MEDIUM degree of regional organization 
> 7: HIGH degree of regional organization 
Example: For Southern Africa in the period from I960 to 1964, the 
regional institution factor is “low,” the intra-regional exports factor is 
“low,” and the weapons imports factor is “low.” According each “low” a 
score o f 1, the total value of the degree of regional organization in that 
time period is 3. According to the above scale, that indicates a low degree 
of regional organization in the 1960 to 1964 period. This calculation is 
done for every region in every time period and the results are displayed in 
Table 2.
Notes
^See Appendix 2 for an explanation of how tite empirical data are 
manipulated.
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